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Abstract
The concept of function arises at all levels of biological study and is often loosely and variously 
defined, especially within ecology. This has led to ambiguity, obscuring the common structure 
that unites levels of biological organisation, from molecules to ecosystems. Here we build on al-
ready successful ideas from molecular biology and complexity theory to create a precise defini-
tion of biological function which spans levels of biological organisation and can be quantified in 
the unifying currency of biomass, enabling comparisons of functional effectiveness (irrespective 
of the specific function) across the field of ecology. We give precise definitions of ecological and 
ecosystem function that bring clarity and precision to studies of biodiversity-ecosystem function 
relationships and questions of ecological redundancy. To illustrate the new concepts and their 
unifying power, we construct a simple community-level model with nutrient cycling and animal-
plant mutualism, emphasising the importance of its network structure in determining overall 
functioning. This type of network structure is that of an autocatalytic set of functional relation-
ships, which also appears at biochemical, cellular and organism levels of organisation, creating a 
nested hierarchy.  This enables a common and unifying concept of function to apply from mo-
lecular interaction networks up to the global ecosystem. 
 Function as a unifying concept for all levels of biological organisation.
Are all the elements of a genome functional or are some junk? Are some species ecologically re-
dundant or do they all have a unique role? Must a thing be naturally selected before it can be ac-
cepted as functional, or is it sufficient that it causes an effect? These questions all hinge on the 
definition we use for function. This became one of the key topics in a recent multi-disciplinary 
workshop “Functional Information: its potential for quantifying biodiversity and its relation to 
ecosystem functioning”, organised by the Synthesis Centre of Biodiversity Sciences, Germany. 
The word ‘function’ has a meaning that may initially seem self-evident and obvious, but it is 
used loosely and for many different meanings in biology, creating ambiguity and uncertainty 
which matters when we come to quantify e.g. biodiversity ecosystem function relationships. 
Here we draw ideas from molecular biology, community ecology, systems and information the-
ory and philosophy of science to construct a precise and quantifiable definition of biological 
function that can unify and focus our thinking on the questions above. The context in which we 
write is one of a growing importance for functional descriptions in ecology (Krause et al., 2014; 
Stouffer et al., 2012), the rise of metagenomic functional analysis (Deng et al 2012; Fierer et al., 
2012; Howe et al., 2014) and controversy over functional elements in, especially, the human ge-
nome (Kellis et al., 2014; Doolitle et al., 2014). Because ‘function’ is used differently among 
sub-disciplines of ecology and wider biology, our aim here is to promote a unifying meaning, 
with three goals. First, to enable cross-fertilisation of ideas through the recognition of a common 
concept of function, so making connections and enabling the discovery of more fundamental 
principles. Second, to enable communication by using ‘function’ terms in a precisely defined 
way. Third, to promote function as a precise, quantitative concept (with units)  to establish a 
common framework for biodiversity-ecosystem function studies and to enable e.g. objectively 
based economic valuation of ecosystem components and diversity (see Farnsworth et al., 2016a). 
More deeply, we aim for a definition of ecological function that can illuminate the extent to 
which ecosystems are coherent systems, as opposed to mere arbitrary assemblies.  
We start by clearly differentiating between ‘function’ and ‘trait’ in the biological context. Violle 
et al., (2007) dispelled much confusion over the term trait, but still today various kinds of proc-
esses and even the values of indices calculated from samples are sometimes considered ‘traits’ 
and this is confusing. Here, we restrict function to describe a process (an action) rather than a 
property of an entity. This leaves the latter to be a trait: a trait is an inherent property of a bio-
logical system (e.g. organism), which may enable a function to be performed in relation to an-
other system (e.g. a community). For example, the propensity (ability and potential motivation) 
towards a behaviour of hiding certain plant seeds is a trait of some mammals which has the func-
tions of dispersing the plants as well as providing a continuous food supply for the mammal 
(note the trait is the propensity, not the behaviour). Hypothetically many more functions of this 
behavioural trait are conceivable, but in practice we must restrict our considerations to actual 
(observed) and ecologically relevant functions, as opposed to potential (hypothesised or not) 
functions because the full range of potential functions is indeterminate (e.g. providing food for 
soil invertebrates may be admissible, but providing a means of counting the mammals is not, 
since the latter is not an ecologically relevant function, but merely a tool of scientific observa-
tion).  
The specific meaning of a function depends on both the functioning entity and the context in 
which it acts (function is relational, not inherent). For example a genetic element may code for a 
protein only in particular circumstances and a species may promote nitrogen turnover only in 
certain environments, therefore they only have those functions in those particular contexts. The 
context, in every case, is the system in which the functioning entity takes part. In a biological 
setting we refer to this as the next higher ‘emergent level’ recognising that living systems are 
composed of a nested hierarchy of organisation: systems constructed from sub-systems (Farn-
sworth et al., 2013). Here, ‘emergent level’ means a structure of organisation that is categorically 
different from those above and below in the hierarchy because it embodies novel information 
from which new function emerges (levels may be ontological or merely epistemic in meaning: 
that is an open debate in philosophy). ‘Categorically different’ means having phenomena (and in 
this context, especially functions) that do not occur at lower levels. Thus, an emergent level has 
associated with it an organisational structure with the properties of a complex system, especially 
the property that new phenomena emerge within it (see Marshall et al., 2016). For example, a 
whole human tribe contains multiple nuclear families, but in category both families and tribes are 
units of human society featuring common social and genetic bonds. Conversely, a human being 
is composed of a collection of cells, but is categorically distinct because emergent information 
organises the body into a whole which transcends its cellular composition (most cells in the body 
are regularly replaced, but the person remains who they are). The philosophical underpinning for 
this idea can be found in the analysis of levels and emergence by List (2016), the concept of 
downward causation (Ellis, 2008; Noble, 2012) and the theory of hierarchy (Salthe, 1985) which 
was related to ecology, especially by O’Neill et al. (1986).  Thus, for example, a population (de-
fined in the traditional sense of a mere aggregate, or count, of individuals) is not categorically 
distinct from the individual organism because no properties emerge from the population level, 
but if the population is considered as an assembly of genes, then it may qualify as distinct from 
the single genome because emergent properties may appear at the level of gene-population. Fur-
ther, a community may be a complex system with an organising structure that leads to emergent 
properties (e.g. trophic cascades or reaction-diffusion patterns), so we categorise it as a distinct 
emergent level. We illustrate how life as a whole can be viewed as a hierarchy of such emergent 
levels (Farnsworth et al., 2013) using the organisational hierarchy given in Table 1, but this does 
not imply that those specific demarkations are fixed or necessary for our understanding of func-
tion. 
From here on, we define biological function with respect to a higher emergent level.  We must 
carefully distinguish between the terms ecological function and ecosystem function. First we de-
fine ecosystem as the system comprising of all organisms along with their interactions with each 
other and with their abiotic environment as well as those parts of the abiotic environment which 
may be influenced by the organisms (in practice this may be studied at a local level if suitable 
isolation and/or account is taken of exogenous influences - e.g. in a mesocosm experiment). 
Given our axioms, ‘ecological function’ must be an act performed by a living system within the 
context of an ecosystem. That applies equally whether the act is physiological, behavioural, one 
of competition, predation or mass-transfer, ecosystem engineering, or organisational - every 
branch of ecology can make use of the same concept here. Ecosystem function is conversely an 
act performed by an ecosystem in some emergent higher system - but what? Many ecologists 
seek a justification for conservation in the ecosystem services (a result of functions) provided for 
human society, tacitly assuming humanity to be the wider context (e.g. deGroot et al., 2012). A 
non-anthropocentric (objective) account places things the other way around (indeed this is a cen-
tral tenet of ecological, as opposed to environmental, economics (Costanza and Daly, 1987). Ob-
jectively, the higher emergent level of ecosystem function must comprise the global geo-
chemical cycle that includes the biosphere performing certain homeostatic processes (Lovelock 
and Margulis, 1974), but this creates a potential inconsistency of logic which we will resolve 
shortly.
In his landmark paper, Jax (2005) resolved the use of the word ‘function’ in ecology into four 
broad meanings: 1) individual-level processes, such as a particular predation event; 2) systemic 
processes, such as nitrogen uptake; 3) individual ‘roles’ defining ‘functional groups’ of organ-
isms, including their contribution to a higher level of organisation, such as the guild of detriti-
vores, or simply a phenotypic (often life-history) category and 4) effects of the activity of work-
ing ecosystems that impinge on human society, leading to ecosystem services. 
We see immediately that (3) describes a set of functional capabilities of organisms and (1) de-
scribes the realisation of one or more of these in practice, whilst (2) does the same but takes a 
coarse-grained view of the system and (4) interprets this from an anthropocentric perspective.
In the following, using examples from ecology and molecular biology, we will argue for a more 
constrained definition of function, in line with (3): that a biological function must demonstrate 
causal effect (Table 2) from one to a higher emergent level of biological organisation. This rela-
tionship enables us to identify ‘functional equivalence sets’ (Table 2), shifting the focus from 
particular systems, defined by their traits, to functional classes. This move enables a logically 
self-consistent and integrative way to assess all kinds of interaction in biological systems, by 
starting from a network of functional equivalence sets. Only by doing this can we be sure that 
function has a standard and inter-comparable meaning, in for example biodiversity-function rela-
tionships. 
Insights from philosophy and molecular biology
A system composed of parts, each of whose existence depends on that of the whole system was 
termed (by Kauffman, 1986) a ‘Kantian whole’ (Table 2), the archetypal example being a bacte-
rial cell (Kauffman and Clayton 2006). The concept of function arises to describe the role that 
the parts play in the system, without having to descend into non-scientific teleology. (Note - the 
origin of this terminology lies in Emanuel Kant’s definition of an organised whole (Ginsborg, 
2006)). Accordingly, the philosopher Cummins (1975) proposed that ‘function’ is an objective 
account of the contribution made by a system’s component to the ‘capacity’ of the whole system. 
Thus Cummins function (Table 2) describes a relationship between a system and one or more of 
its component parts. The relationship is that at least one process performed by the component/s is 
necessary for a process performed by the whole system, as in the case of category (3) of the Jax 
(2005) schema. This is a powerful idea we shall use from here on. What we will add is clarifica-
tion about what specifies the ‘whole system’, particularly how it is bounded, and how this con-
cept can be turned into a tool for quantifying function, especially, expanding the notion of being 
‘necessary’ to a rigorous quantification of causal effect. Natural selection for a particular compo-
nent within an organism provides a clear example. In that case, the component (e.g. an eye) con-
tributes a process that increases the (quantifiable) Darwinian fitness of the organism, thereby 
demonstrating Cummins function. The idea, that ‘true biological functions’ should be naturally 
selected, has already emerged in the field of molecular biology, though a broader set of function 
is advocated by some - as we next discuss.
Recently, thousands of full genomes have been sequenced, not the least being the human ge-
nome, and efforts to interpret this new data have stirred up the controversy over ‘junk DNA’, 
which is taken to be the alternative to ‘functional DNA’ (see Kellis et al., 2014). In this field, lit-
tle attention has been paid to the precise meaning of ‘function’, despite much loose talk of ‘func-
tional DNA’. In their criticism, Doolitle et al., (2014) clarified the range of potential meanings of 
the term and the conceptual errors that may arise from failing to resolve them. The most justifi-
able assignment of function to a DNA element, they argued, was where selection at the organism 
level was demonstrated. This is only a subset of cases where a causal role has been established. 
Alternatives include a) selection at higher or lower emergent levels, b) neutral (non-selective) 
processes, which frequently ratchet their way into conserved stability, and c) spandrels (the term 
used by Gould and Lewontin (1979), for by-products of selection). Doolitle et al. (2014) were 
careful to distinguish the spandrels from “mere effects”, which play no causal role in the system 
to which they belong: spandrels play an unintended and perhaps irrelevant causal role (e.g. the 
‘thumping sound’ of the heart). 
Building on this, we may at least ascribe the word ‘functional’ to biological systems having 
causal effects that are known to have been naturally selected for at any level of organisation sub-
ject to natural selection (not only species, but also gene, or genetic network). They are functional 
in the Cummins sense and their causal effect can be quantified by the change in fitness they cause 
in the system to which they belong. However, this definition would leave out systems with 
Cummins function but not derived from natural selection. They would be left as ‘merely’ causal, 
rather than biologically functional. These causal systems could be subsystems of naturally se-
lected systems, for example ‘molecular machines’ (e.g. the ATP synthase complex), or biochemi-
cal networks (examples in Jaeger and Calkins, 2012), or they may be super-systems of them: 
populations or communities of organisms. We may therefore conceive of a hierarchy-spanning 
causal chain in which a process performed at one level enables another at a higher level, in turn 
enabling another at some further level, perhaps all the way from molecular interactions to eco-
logical processes. 
The emergence of metagenomic functional analysis of microbial communities bypasses the indi-
vidual, and traditional taxonomic levels of biological organisation by making a direct link be-
tween genes and the selective environment.  Processes that are being (RNA), or could be (DNA) 
performed at levels beyond that of the individual organism have been identified directly from the 
genetic level (Tringe et al., 2005; Warnecke et al., 2007; Huttenhower et al., 2012; Howe et al., 
2014). Functional genomics implies that environmental selection operates on functions derived at 
the molecular level: genes are expressed with frequencies related to their function in a given en-
vironment. With the new genetic tools, function is readily discerned because the link between 
gene expression and functional protein or peptide is usually known and unambiguous, irrespec-
tive of our knowledge of its natural selection. Although eukaryotic organisms typically present 
more complicated and often less clear geno-phenotypic links, the method is also developing for 
them (see e.g. Knack et al., 2015). These new molecular tools reveal a literal functioning: the 
causal chain leading from one biomolecule to the next. The components (e.g. functional genes) 
are performing Cummins function for the organism level - which because of this, performs 
Cummins function at the community level - and their performance is well defined and quantifi-
able. This unambiguous identification of a causal chain is the ideal towards which ecologists may 
strive (Gotelli et al., 2012; Bohmann et al., 2014). Accordingly, we now offer a definition for bio-
logical function: 
A biological function is a process enacted by a biological system A at emergent level n which 
influences one or more processes of a system B at level n+1, of which A is a component part. 
This definition is similar to , and includes as a special case, that of Cummins function, but more 
precisely identifies the link between emergent levels of organisation. By tracing functional ef-
fects through the nested hierarchy leading from one to the next higher emergent level, it can be 
made explicit how a function at the molecular level can be functional at an ecological level. Ear-
lier we noted that at the highest emergent level - that of the global ecosystem, a logical inconsis-
tency may arise: it is obvious that by definition at the highest level n’ there can be no n’+1. The 
solution to this is to admit an exception to the logic of our definition for this case, where refer-
ence to ‘ecosystem function’ must mean only the processes at the level of the ecosystem. 
The definition does not require a history of natural selection and it does not require a ‘good’ out-
come for the system (as selection would), for example, self-reactive immunoglobulin E causes 
autoimmune diseases (Schuerwegh et al. 2010), but is still functional in the sense defned here. 
The latter point answers the philosophical objection often levelled at scientific accounts of func-
tion (see e.g. Griffiths, 1993), which arises from the teleological (referring to purpose) and nor-
mative (what ought to be) connotations of the every-day use of the word ‘function’ (a rich litera-
ture on philosophical approaches to biological function is reviewed by Mayr (1974) and Neander 
(2011)). Our definition creates a clear separation between these everyday meanings of function 
and a strict scientific meaning and also permits an objective distinction to be drawn between 
‘function’ and ‘dysfunction’, as we will shortly explain.
If functions are strictly processes, then potentially more than one system component can perform 
them and functional redundancy and substitution become possible. This idea, which we now in-
corporate into our definition of function is usefully formalised by the concept of  functional 
equivalence class (FEC) (Table 2), which has grown from analysis of biochemical networks. The 
FEC was defined by Auletta et al., (2008) as a set of biochemical ‘operations’ having effects in 
common which are relevant to ‘goals’. The FEC consists of all operations (behaviours or proc-
esses) having the effect in question and this is context-dependent because an effect always de-
pends on the nature of both the subject and the object. For example, the DNA sequences and cor-
responding protein structures of alcohol dehydrogenases in vertebrates bear no similarity with 
those of Drosophila and they work through different chemical reactions, but achieve the same 
end result of removing hydrogen from alcohol (Doolitle 1994). Those different dehydrogenasing 
processes form an FEC with respect to frugivorous organisms (and would not with respect to ob-
ligate carnivores). The existence of alcohols in fruit arises from interactions among plants and 
micro-organisms (i.e. at the community level) and exerts natural selection on the metabolic proc-
esses (cellular level) of frugiverous organisms. This illustrates a general feature of FECs:  they 
define the function at one emergent level in terms of processes at a higher level, which in turn 
must include at least one component from among them. Any function specifying an FEC com-
plies with the definition of Cummins function. Using the FEC generalises the concept by identi-
fying the source of causation: it is not the individual components performing the function, but the 
FEC (i.e. the macro-level unit). This allows for the possibility of functional redundancy and sub-
stitution: both important features illustrated at the ecological level by species turn-over and at the 
sub-species level by heterologies and convergence (reviewed by McGhee, 2011). We next dis-
cuss the extent to which this definition of biological function applies in ecology, with special ref-
erence to the biodiversity-function relationship.
At what level do ecological communities function?
Function in ecological communities had traditionally been thought different from function in 
whole or parts of organisms because ecological systems do not fit the conventional model of 
Darwinian evolution (Maclaurin and Sterelny, 2008). Recent evidence (e.g. from the maintained 
integrity of coalescing communities Rillig, et al., 2015) and an emerging ecological theory: the 
‘extended evolutionary synthesis’ (EES)’ (Laland et al., 2015) challenges that view. Built on 
niche construction theory (Odling-Smee et al. 1996) and the concept of reciprocal causation in 
which organisms influence their evolution via ecological processes (Laland et al., 2011) EES in-
cludes the ecosystem as an integral part of a complex evolutionary process. 
The predominance in community ecology of predator-prey networks, described by flows of en-
ergy in foodwebs has emphasised an incomplete model of community structure in which only 
one function (energy flow) is admitted, rendering what Loreau (2010) calls ‘horizontal diversity’ 
redundant. In every real community, each organism performs more than one function and func-
tions are more than contributions to energy flow. This has been recognised in the development of 
community models based on nutrient-cycling (e.g. Loreau, 1996; Thébault and Loreau (2003); 
Loreau (2010) and in the study of mutualistic networks involving pollinators and seed dispersal 
(e.g.  Schleuning et al., 2015), to which parasites and ‘ecosystem engineers’ might be added (see 
e.g. Bruno et al., 2003). As Krause et al., (2014) explicitly state, ecosystem functioning results 
from the interactions among organisms, which though based on organism diversity are a (ne-
glected) form of diversity in themselves. Our definition of function as strictly relational calls at-
tention to the importance of the interaction network as a component of diversity and it identifies 
the organisation (network structure) of its component ecological functions as the (proximate) 
cause of ecosystem function. This is a  point we wish to emphasise, especially because so far, the 
mainstream of studies into biodiversity / ecosystem function (BEF) relationships has neglected 
the contribution of the community network (in and of itself) to ecological functioning (Hooper et 
al., 2005; Cardinale et al., 2012), despite contradictory evidence (e.g. Bascompte, 2009; Grey et 
al., 2014; Valiente-Banuet et al., 2015). Experimental manipulations that discriminate the effect 
of network structure (the organisation of functions at the community level) from organism effects 
(the traits enabling ecological functions) will be challenging, but are necessary to appreciate the 
extent to which the higher emergent level of community operates.
What this says about functional redundancy
Functional redundancy does not mean that a system will be unaffected by species loss. The idea 
that species may be mutually redundant can arise from the neglect of the quantitative contribu-
tions made by individual organisms to ecological processes. Functionally substitutability (be-
longing to the same FEC) does not imply mutual redundancy: an analogy with members of a tug-
of-war team illustrates how individual organisms can be functionally substitutable, but not re-
dundant. In community ecology, this point is well illustrated by empirical findings, e.g. from 
O’Gorman and Emmerson (2009) and Isbell et al., (2011). Further, we must distinguish between 
redundancy and degeneracy. Consider a set of n species S, and a set of k functions F. We associ-
ate a k-long vector of functions fi with each member species si, the values in the vector being the 
quantified contributions of si to each of the k functions in F. Now we can transform from n spe-
cies to m functional equivalence sets E by gathering all those members of S sharing the same f. 
But being relational, functional equivalence must be defined relative to the context, i.e. the envi-
ronmental conditions. Organisms that are members of FEC ej in E, irrespective of environment 
are qualitatively redundant, but those that only share fj in common for a particular environment 
are merely degenerate with respect to that environment alone (Tononi et. al., 1999). This is the 
basis for the ‘insurance’ justification for biodiversity in the environmental economics literature 
(Yachi and Loreau, 1999; Baumgärtner, 2007). 
Community ecology and especially BEF research has tended to account for one single species-
level Cummins function at a time (e.g. primary productivity), though this constriction was eased, 
notably by Gamfeldt et al., (2008) and Isbell et al., (2011) and by attempts to integrate mutualis-
tic networks along with competition, predator prey and parasitism (see Kefi et al., 2012 and re-
views by Krause et al., 2014 and Namba, 2015). Since each organism can perform many func-
tions and each function can be performed by many organisms, it makes sense to transform from 
networks of species-specific populations to quantitative functional networks of FECs. Many 
community ecologists have started to refocus this way (e.g. Schleuning et al., 2015), aided by 
increased data from molecular ecology which can more precisely isolate function (e.g. Zhou et 
al., 2010; Deng et al., 2012; Fierer et al., 2012). There is insufficient evidence to claim that any 
organism is functionally redundant in the quantitative, multi-functional sense (Gamfeldt et al., 
2008, Farnsworth et al., 2012) and we think it unlikely.
The problem of quantifying functions
Identifying FECs is a key component of the functional analysis of biological systems. 
FECs may be equated with observed functions from metagenomic functional analysis (see e.g. 
Fierer et al., 2012) and other identified processes such as metabolism, predation and specific eco-
system engineering. When this option is not available, we must identify a set of a-priori function 
classes to which observed functions are assigned for which we will need an objective method. 
The choice of classes will depend on the degree of difference among functions we would con-
sider sufficient to identify them as separate. This may be objectively estimated from the overlap-
ping of the functions’ effects, for which the concept of ‘effective number’ in biodiversity (Jost, 
2006, Chao et al., 2014) was applied to ecosystem processes by Ulanowicz et al., (2014) (specifi-
cally using a Hill exponent of unity, overlapping (degenerate) functions would be combined by 
the exponent of Shannon’s entropy, which forms a weighted geometric mean). Observed func-
tions would be assigned in proportion to both the number of components (enzymes, populations, 
etc.) and the effectiveness of the functions in any given environment. Effectiveness is empirically 
quantifiable given a precise definition of the function as a process. For some processes this ap-
proach is already well established. For example, predation is quantified by the individual (per-
capita) ‘functional response’ (see e.g. Dick et al., (2014) for a relevant application). Ecosystem 
engineering is often highly context specific, but empirical approaches have been found (e.g. 
Queiros et al., 2011). The approach we are suggesting calls for a precise definition and identifica-
tion of FECs, for which the payoff is likely to be a more robust understanding of how biological 
systems work. 
As we have defined them, functions are causal. Thus in principle we can quantify them in both 
magnitude and direction, according to their causal effect (for which structural equation modelling 
and related methods may be useful (Shipley, 2000). In practice this can be very difficult  for 
complex systems with reciprocal causation (Laland et al., 2011), particularly in the face of lim-
ited time-series data samples, latent variables, and incomplete knowledge of the system under 
consideration ( see Sugihara et al., 2012 and Deyle et al., 2016). Recent developments in 
information-theoretic and network analysis (e.g. Zenil et al., 2016) combined with knock-out ex-
periments to discern causal interactions (Pearl, 2000) provide a way forward. Measures of func-
tional effectiveness can, in principle, be assessed at and across different levels of organisation of 
a system (Marshall et al., 2016), but application of these rigorous theoretical measures to eco-
logical systems demands the acquisition of extensive time-series data. 
In summary, the measurement and even identification of individual functions remains difficult 
and no unifying methods presently exist. Understanding systems as organised wholes, each with 
an overall function, offers a pragmatic solution to this problem. We do not need to construct a 
higher level function from a set of individual and disparate lower level functions. We may take 
an engineering ‘black-box’ approach: measuring the system-level effect of all internal (including 
obscure) functions aggregated as a system output represented by a “master function”. We will 
explore this concept next, starting with an illustrative example.
As a specific example consider the (highly simplified) illustrative model community in Figure 1 
(detailed description in Appendix), which depicts four trophic levels and five functions: nitrogen 
supply (recycling, fixation, nitrification etc.), carbon supply, with the consequent functions of 
carbon and nitrogen flow, and reproductive facilitation (e.g. pollination). Note that the functions 
are individually quantified in their own native units (i.e. units of carbon flow rate, nitrogen flow 
rate and e.g. pollination rate). Every function performed in the system is contingent on every 
other, because each depends on the biomass (living stock) and thereby the growth rate of the spe-
cies in each FEC providing it. This in turn depends on the species supplying functions necessary 
for this growth. Analysis of functional dependencies (Figure 2) shows that every function ulti-
mately depends on the aggregate community-level biomass production rate (B), but this in turn 
depends on every function. This illustrates two important principles: first that the FECs form an 
autocatalytic set (sensu Kauffman, 1986) and second that due to the recursive structure (every-
thing depends on everything else) the system is in causal closure (Table 2) and thereby (Kauff-
man and Clayton, 2006) constitutes a Kantian whole (note this conclusion strictly applies only to 
the model, not necessarily to the real system of which it is a model). The closure referred to here 
is strictly causal and not material, nor thermodynamic. Causal closure means that the network of 
causal interactions is sufficient to describe the behaviour at the system level, given the necessary 
material and energy supply from the environment (Hordijk & Steel, 2004), acknowledging that 
living systems are always materially and thermodynamically open. This causal closure is a gen-
eral property of the physiology of individual organisms (Luisi 2003), many biochemical sub-
systems of life (Kauffman 1986) and as our example now illustrates, at least some ecological 
systems. If ecological communities do have this attribute (as also demonstrated by Gatti et al. 
2016), then they may have at least some aspects of causal autonomy: rather than being merely a 
dynamically stable collection of populations, there may be an emergent organising level, exercis-
ing downward control through selection (Ellis 2012; List, 2014). This would reinforce the moti-
vation to conserve communities as a whole and add to our understanding of community resil-
ience and recovery (as illustrated by the Bikini coral reefs, following destruction by atomic 
weapon testing - Richards et al., 2008). As an illustration of the mutual dependencies, Figure 3 
shows the equilibrium biomass (excluding nutrient providers) of the community which varies 
with a) the asymptote of nutrient providers’ functional response and b) the effectiveness of re-
production facilitation for plants by animals. The community dynamics are tremendously com-
plicated (Appendix) as is typical of a system with several autocatalytic loops and the result of 
exogenous perturbations is determined by internal relationships and correspondingly difficult to 
predict.  
The concept of Master Function
Most broadly, a community that can be viewed as a Kantian whole is consistent with a general 
definition of life: “A system can be said to be living if it is able to transform external matter and 
energy into an internal process of self-maintenance and production of its own components” (Lu-
isi, 2003, p52). By this definition, all biological function ultimately amounts to production of liv-
ing cells (both somatic and population growth) and this is readily quantified by biomass (assum-
ing the mean mass of a cell in a sufficiently large sample does not change). Accordingly, we can 
regard biomass production as a ‘master function’ (Jaeger and Calkins, 2012), meaning that all 
functions may be quantified by their contribution to it (by analogy, all processes in a factory may 
ultimately be quantified by their contribution to the profit made by the factory owning business). 
Alternatives to biomass have been inspired by approaches from physics and computer science: 
energy dissipation based on thermodynamic theory, e.g. Kaila and Annila (2008) and diversifica-
tion based on complexity theory (Kauffman, 2000). We chose to focus on biomass production 
because it is most readily measured in practice and also has a clear biological and evolutionary 
basis. 
The idea of a master function removes the need for a teleological account of function: it is the 
de-facto end point of the causal chains to which all other biological functions belong, in the 
proximal (e.g. physiological process) as opposed to ultimate (natural selection) sense of Mayr’s 
(1961) dichotomy (modified by Laland et al., 2011). Any biological process which enhances the 
fitness of a biological system, increases the system’s potential to reproduce and by this, over 
time, it increases the amount of biomass embodying it. The ‘master function’ concept enables an 
objective and non-teleological distinction to be made between function and dysfunction, when-
ever the suggestion of Neander (1991) - to base the distinction on natural selection - is not avail-
able (as discussed previously).  Mayr (1974) distinguished ‘teleomatic processes’ (directed by 
“natural laws”, hence deterministic and including abiotic processes)  from ‘teleonomic process’ 
(defined as “goal-directed” and characteristic of living systems). We interpret goal-direction as 
the operation of the master function, so can define dysfunction as that which counters the master 
function and remain scientifically objective.  Any component, or any process, which negatively 
influences the operation of the master function can be regarded as counter-teleonomic (in the 
Mayr (1974) sense). Using a neutral concept of function identifies dysfunction without having to 
make a normative assumption about an underlying aim of the system and enables an objective 
measure of what Cummins referred to as a ‘contribution’.  
Using biomass as the ‘master function’ means that all functions at all levels of biological organi-
sation can be quantified in terms of their contribution to biomass production (which may be 
found in vivo  by e.g. species removal, or gene knockouts, or in computational simulations 
through sensitivity analysis as illustrated in Figure 3). So whilst every kind of function can be 
quantified in its own native units, we can also quantify it in the community context (referring to 
the function to which it contributes at the higher emergent level), by its effect on aggregated 
biomass production. Notice that this is true at the community level, but also at the level of cells, 
where reproduction via completing the cell-cycle is the ‘master-function’ (as illustrated in Jaeger 
and Calkins, 2012). In our suggested interpretation, biomass production is a universal currency 
for biological function, which integrates ecological function with that defined at any other level 
of biological organisation. We can quantify function (of any process) in terms of the specific 
change in the rate of creation of cells (fitness), given the presence / absence of the functional 
component (this is analogous to the power density proposed by Chaisson (2011) as a surrogate 
for complexity). While individual processes of course all appear in different units, the integrative 
framework proposed enables them all to be interpreted in the common currency of biomass pro-
duction, using e.g. mathematical simulations to examine the effect of removing any functional 
component upon the production rate of the remaining system, following recovery to a new equi-
librium (as in Fung et al., 2015). 
Conclusion
The Biblical lesson of the ‘tower of Babel’ was that division and confusion results from a frag-
mentation of language.  By establishing a common and precise meaning for the word ‘function’, 
we believe a conceptual unity can arise among the various sub-disciplines of biology. We have 
found that biological systems at all levels of organisation share the properties of auto-catalytic 
sets and that this enables us to summarise the aggregate effect of ecological functions via specific 
biomass production rate, which serves as an integrating surrogate measure of their effectiveness.  
Specifically, to quantify biological function, irrespective of whether this is genetic, cellular or 
ecological (behavioural, physiological, population, community or process), we suggest the fol-
lowing steps: 
1) Identify the emergent level of the system under study and the next higher emergent level of 
which it is a component (Table 1) - noting that if the system is the global ecosystem, then by 
definition, this is not possible.
2) Identify the FEC(s) to which the study system belongs (in relation to the higher emergent 
level) - this amounts to specifying the system’s functions in terms of relationships among the 
parts. 
3) Perform knockout / elimination experiments (or simulation study) to quantify function in 
terms of the master function for the higher emergent level. The whole of this level should be in-
cluded in the experiments, except when the higher emergent level is the ecosystem, for which 
study of a local part entails defining its functional boundary. This would be obvious in an ex-
periment which biologically isolates a living system (e.g. as a mesocosm), but in field conditions 
it is necessary to account for any exogenous biological function (e.g. enrichment by nutrients, 
seed dispersal or the indirect influence of predators from the surrounding system). 
This kind of approach is now well established in molecular biology for investigating gene regula-
tion networks, the result of protein expression and signalling networks. It is developing in the 
analysis of prokaryotic communities via functional analysis of ‘environmental’ gene sequence 
data. Here we have shown that it can be extended to levels of organisation beyond the individual 
organism and applied generally in all fields of ecological science, thus integrating the concept of 
function and its analysis over all levels of biological organisation. 
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__________________________________________________________________________
1) Molecule (including physical structure of informational bio-polymer).
2) Molecular network (including information content of bio-polymer, control or signalling sys-
tem and metabolic pathway).
3) Prokaryotic cell and organelle of the eukaryotic cell and a population of such. 
4) Eukaryotic cell and a population* of such. 
5) Multicellular organism and a population* of such.
6) Ecological community, including cellular colony and meta-community.
7) The global bio-geo-chemical system of plant Earth.
__________________________________________________________________________
* Meta-population is also included, unless inter-population interactions are complex, in which 
case, the meta-population would be better categorised as a community. 
 Table 2.
__________________________________________________________________________
Causal effect: An effect that can unambiguously be attributed to a process: it only exists when 
the process is operative.
Cummins function: A process performed by a component that is necessary for performance of a 
higher level process by the system of which it is part.
Functional Equivalence Class (/Set) (FEC): The set of components of a system that share in 
common a particular function in the context of a higher emergent level.
Kantian whole: A self-contained system in the sense that the parts make the whole and the 
whole makes the parts (from raw materials and energy that may be obtained from its environ-
ment). In biology, this term (attributed to Kauffman, 1986)  is most useful for characterising 
auto-catalytic sets in which components collectively by their functions, maintain and create the 
system to which they belong. The system is interpreted as a higher emergent level than the com-
ponent parts. The information embodied by the system (at the higher emergent level) which is 
responsible for the ordering of the interactions among its components at the lower emergent level 
has been termed a Transcendent Complex (Farnsworth et al., 2016b).
Causal Closure: In this context (rather than in philosophy in general) closure is defined by Hor-
dijk and Steel (2004) as the condition of an autocatalytic system whereby every reaction is cata-
lysed by at least one component of the system and every reactant is created from a specified 
‘food set’ of raw materials, using the reactions of the set. This last condition explicitly acknowl-
edges that the system must be materially open. In general a system may be thermodynamically 
and materially open, yet causally closed. The Hordijk and Steel (2004) definition gives mathe-
matical rigour to the concept of Kantian whole, i.e. a self-sustaining system supported by a suffi-
cient supply of raw materials and energy: it is causally closed but not thermodynamically nor 
materially closed.
__________________________________________________________________________
  TABLE LEGEND
Table 1: An illustrative emergent hierarchy of biological systems. At each level, properties 
emerge that cannot be explained by reference to its component parts (existing at the next lower 
level) alone. This is because every emergent level is associated with a causal interaction network 
among the component parts. The information embodied in this network is the source of the 
emergent properties.  Note that since any ‘ecosystem’ is a part of the global  bio-geo-chemical 
system of plant Earth and not categorically different from it (in the sense of emergent properties), 
level 7 represents all members of the ‘ecosystem’ category. In practice, effectively isolated parts 
of the ecosystem may be studied as though independent. 
Table 2. Glossary of terms.  FIGURE LEGENDS
Fig 1. An illustrative ecological community consisting of primary producer FECs (P1, P2); pri-
mary consumers (C1,C2), secondary consumers (C3,C4), the tertiary consumer C5 and nitrogen 
suppliers (N). Thin solid arrows show trophic flows, thin dotted arrows show reproductive facili-
tation (e.g. pollination and seed dispersal), thick black dashed arrows show nutrient flow (in iso-
lation) and grey dashed show waste nitrogen, which is assumed all to return to N. The system 
can be envisaged as three parallel functional networks (nutrient recycling, carbon pumping and 
reproductive facilitation). Together, these functions catalyse one another so that the whole system 
is an autocatalytic-set. 
Fig. 2. Functional dependencies show the community to be an autocatalytic set. In (a) reproduc-
tive facilitation (R) depends on FECs C1 and C4, which in turn depend on biomass production of 
P1 and C2, respectively, which in turn depend on nitrogen supply from N and reproductive facili-
tation R - forming an autocatalytic loop. The ellipse symbols indicate ‘jointly necessary’, other-
wise parallel inputs are mutually degenerate, or redundant. C: carbon supply; N: nitrogen supply, 
B(E) is biomass production rate of the whole community.  Note that all functions ultimately de-
pend on - and result in - B(E). For this reason, B(E) provides a suitable ‘master function’ with 
which to quantify all internal functions. 
Fig. 3. How equilibrium total system biomass B - the master function - varies with the rate of 
plant reproductive facilitation by consumer species and also the asymptote of the functional re-
sponse of nutrient providers, to supply of raw materials (nutrient FR). The plot was formed from 
finite-difference numerical calculations of the system (Appendix equations 6-13). The dynamics 
did not converge to an equilibrium for combinations of values, which is the reason for the few 
missing and aberrant results (intentionally left visible in the plot). References
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Functional analysis of ecosystem dynamics:
Supplementary Appendix for Unifying concepts of biological function
from molecules to ecosystems.
Keith D Farnsworth, Larissa Albantakis and Tancredi Caruso.
We represent carbon / energy / biomass by the cell count in each living compartment
and write differential equations to account for this in each compartment. Additionally,
we account for a generic nutrient x which is supplied by the nutrient supplier compart-
ment with biomass N (consisting of all organisms with a nutrient recycling or supply role:
detritivores, decomposers and nutrient fixers) and also the catalytic effect of reproductive
facilitators of primary producers (selected from among consumers), these being the polli-
nators and seed dispersers. The dynamics of nutrient suppliers combines the total growth
of all waste processors combined, for which the resource is waste - in various forms and
states of decay - as it passes along a process chain within this compartment. The total
flux of waste is assumed to be proportional to the total living biomass of the system.
Growth of nutrient suppliers is assumed to be limited by density-dependence and by the
specific rate of waste processing, represented by a functional response:
N˙ = N(fN(B)(1− αN/KN)), (1)
where B =
∑
T (BT ) is the total biomass of the system; BT is the biomass of trophic
level T . The function fN(·) is the ’functional response’ of nutrient producers. αN is the
competition coefficient (all causes) among nutrient suppliers and KN is their aggregate
carrying capacity. We also define fP (·) for primary producers and fC(·) for all consumers.
In each case, the functional response is (for simplicity) given by:
fX(y) = (
τy
1 + y
), (2)
where y is the resource needed for X to grow (this is a Michaelis-Menten or type II
functional response) and τ is the trophic (ecological) efficiency. We assume nutrient x
is supplied by nutrient suppliers in proportion to their biomass x˙ = νN , where ν is the
specific rate of recycling nutrients that can be taken up by the primary producers.
Primary producer dynamics consist of density-dependent growth (including inter- and
intra-specific competition) regulated by reproductive facilitation (pollination, seed disper-
sal etc., provided by those consumer populations which contribute) and predation loss
from consumers. Reproduction follows a saturating function of facilitator population, for
which we also use the type II functional response in analogy to equation 2. For the ith
primary producer:
P˙i = Pi
(
(fP (x˙) ψi
Ri
1 + Ri
(1−
∑
j α
P
ijPj
KPi
))−
∑
j
CjγijfC(P )
)
, (3)
1
